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CRIMINAL LAW-THE HUSBAND'S RAPE EXEMPTION: AN EQUAL
PROTECTION ALTERNATIVE-State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219,
372 A.2d 386 (Essex County Ct. 1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Albert Smith defied a court order and went to his wife's
apartment, broke down the door, and beat and raped her in the
presence of their children. 1 He was charged with raping and as
saulting his wife. In dismissing the rape charge, the New Jersey
trial court rejected the state's contention that the rape statute 2
should be interpreted to allow prosecution of a husband for raping
his wife when he engages in forcible intercourse without her con
sent. Instead, the court followed the common law rule that a hus
band cannot rape his wife, even though it disagreed with the
policies and rationales behind the rule. This decision adds to the
New Jersey rape statute a provision not included on the face of the
statute. The added provision denies married women who are raped
by their husbands equal protection under the law.
The husband's exemption from criminal liability for raping his
wife can be traced back to the reasoning of England's Sir Matthew
Hale that the wife, by entering into the marriage contract, gave
irrevocable consent to intercourse with her husband whenever he
desired. 3 With few modifications, the rule that a husband cannot
be prosecuted for raping his wife remains intact in England. 4
l. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 306, 320 n.99 (1977).
For purposes of this discussion, rape refers to sexual intercourse with a woman
against her will and does not refer to the legal implications of the act.
2. The statute provides:
2A: 138-l. Rape and carnal abuse; penalty
Any person who has carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against her
will, or while she is under the influence of any narcotic drug, or who, being
of the age of 16 or over, unlawfully and carnally abuses a woman-child
under the age of 12 years, with or without her consent, is guilty of a h~gh
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by
imprisonment for not more than 30 years, or both; or who, being of the age
of 16 or over, unlawfully and carnally abuses a woman-child of the age of 12
years or over, but under the age of 16 years, with or without her consent, is
guilty of a high misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or both.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 138-1 (West 1969) (emphasis added).
3. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn ed.
1778), as cited in Note, supra note 1, at 307 n.12.
4. A husband can be convicted for raping his wife when there has been a judi
cial decree of separation, since the decree revokes the marital consent. Rex v. Clarke,
[1949) 2 All E.R. 448. The mere filing for divorce, however, does not revoke the
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United States courts have followed the basic English rule. No court
has convicted a husband for raping his wife while the couple is still
married and living together. 5 Some jurisdictions have gone so far as
to hold that marriage is a valid defense to rape even when the
couple is no longer living together. 6 Since a husband cannot be
prosecuted for raping his wife, he cannot be prosecuted for the
attempted rape of his wife. 7 As in England, a husband can only be
convicted in connection with the rape of his wife when he aids,
abets, or forces another man to have intercourse with his wife
against her will. 8
Legislatures have been more willing than courts to narrow the
common law exemption. 9 Twenty-seven states include the hus
band's exemption in their rape statutes. 10 Some states have mod
ified the common law exemption by exempting the husband if the
parties are separated by judicial decree. l l Other states deny the
exemption if the parties are not living together and one of the
spouses has filed for divorce or separation. 12 Still others exempt
/

marital 'consent, even if the parties are not living together. Regina v. Miller, [1954] 2
All Kil. 529. In addition, even Hale recognized that a husband can be convicted
when he forces his wife to have intercourse with another man, English, The Hus
band Who Rapes His Wife, 126 NEW L.J. 1223 (1976). In this situation, the husband
is convicted for assisting in the rape, and not for the rape itself. Id.
5. Note, supra note 1, at 321. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1017, 1019
(1962).
6. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857).
7. Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142,86 S.W. 754 (1905).
8. Elliot v. State, 190 Ga. 803, 10 S.E.2d 843 (1940); State v. Martin, 17 N.C.
App. 317, 194 S.K2d 60 (1973). Even if, in addition to aiding and abetting others to
do so, the husband rapes his wife, his conviction rests on the aiding and abetting and
not on the actual rape which he committed. State v. Drope, 462 S.W.2d 677 (Mo.
1971).
9. For an extensive classification of rape statutes, see Note, supra note 1, at
317-19.
10. Id. at 308. Illinois, for example, defines rape as follows:
§ 11-1. Rape
' /
I
.
(a) A male person of the age of 14 years and upwa'rds who has sexual
intercourse with a female, not his wife, by force and against her will, com
mits rape. Intercourse by force and against her will includes, but is not lim
ited to any intercourse which occurs in the following situations:
(1) where the female is unconscious; or
(2) where the female is so mentally deranged or deficient that she can
not give effective consent to intercourse.

* * * *

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
11. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 464D (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (1976).
12. E.g., MINN. STAT. AN"I. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1977); NEV. REv. STAT. §
200.373 (1977).
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the husband only if the couple is living together. 13 One state, Del
aware, has completely abandoned the exemption. 14 Congress is
also considering the marital rape exemption in the Criminal Code
Reform Act,15 which was recently passed by the Senate. The Sen
ate Committee on the Judiciary found "no legislative distinction
between violent ravishment by strangers and less brutal schemes to
take advantage of an initially consensual relationship. "16
13. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (Supp. 1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
632-A:5 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-20 (1975).
14. The statute now provides: "A male is guilty of rape in the second degree
when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a female without her con
sent." DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 763 (Supp. 1977). The statute had formerly read: "A male
is guilty of rape when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a female
not his wife without her consent, or when he intentionally engages in sexual inter
course with a male without such male's consent." DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 763 (1975)
(amended 1974) (emphasis added).
South Dakota, which had eliminated the exemption, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-22-1 (Supp. 1976), has reinstated it, providing: "Rape is an act of sexual penetra
tion accomplished with any person other than the actor's spouse under anyone or
more of the following circumstances. . . ." S.D. COMPLIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1
(Special Supp. 1977).
15. The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary states:
Subsection (a) of section 1641 provides that a person is guilty of an offense if
he engages in a sexual act and (1) compels the other person to participate in
such act (A) by force, or (B) by threatening or placing the other person in
fear that any person will immediately be subjected to death, serious bodily
injury, or kidnapping, or (2) with intent to engage in a sexual act, has sub
stantially impaired the ability of the other person to approve or control con
duct by administering or employing a substance that he knows is a drug or
intoxicant, or by other means, without the knowledge or against the will of
the other person, or (3) the other person, is, in fact; less than twelve years
old.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT, S. REP. No.
1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1977).
The Model Penal Code, however, includes the husband's exemption in its defi
nition of rape:
§ 213.1. Rape and Related Offenses
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife
is guilty of rape if:
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted
on anyone; or
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control
her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resis
tance; or
(c) the female is unconscious; or
(d) the female is less than 10 years old.

* * * *

MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962).
16. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT, S.
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Commentators have espoused various rationales both in sup
port of and in opposition to the husband's rape exemption. The
earliest rationale used to support the husband's exemption was the
implied consent doctrine as stated by Hale. 17 However, implied
consent is a poor justification for protecting the husband from pros
ecution, since it is unreasonable to infer from a woman's decision
to marry that she intends to make her body accessible whenever
the husband wants. IS
Modem commentators who support the rule point first to
problems of proof. Areas where such problems could arise include
the wife's inability to recollect objectively at trial 19 and the diffi
culty presented in proving lack of consent. 20 However, problems of
proof are easily exaggerated. 21 Similar problems exist in any rape
prosecution and should not bar prosecution when the accused and
victim are married. 22 Moreover, the major problem regarding rape
today is the reluctance of victims to press charges, rather than prob
lems of proof. 23
Another argument advanced in support of the exemption is
that reconciliation and marital harmony are fostered by barring
prosecution. 24 To be sure, once the wife initiates a rape prosecu
tion, there is little chance for the couple to make amends. Recon
ciliation, however, is not a realistic justification unless some mat
rimonial harmony remains in the relationship.25 If the parties are
no longer concerned with the furtherance of the relationship, the
wife should be protected from her husband. 26
An additional reason used to support the exemption is the fear
that the wife will threaten her husband with rape prosecution in

REp. No. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1977). This is especially significant in light
of the fact that only one state, Delaware, has acted so broadly. Hopefully, the future
passage of this Act will encourage other states to change their law regarding the
husband's exemption.
17. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
18. 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722 (1954).
19. Id. at 725.
20. Note, supra note 1, at 314; Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the
Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 640-45 (1976).
21. Note, supra note 1, at 314.
22. Id.; English, supra note 4, at 1224.
23. The stigma associated with rape, the reluctance to face embarassing insinu
ations at trial, and the fear of retaliation by the defendant are some of the reasons
why rape is one of the most underreported crimes. Note, supra note 1, at 315.
24. 6 STAN. L. REV., supra note 18, at 725.
25. Note, supra note 1, at 315.
26. English, supra note 4, at 1225.
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order to force a favorable property settlement. 27 This fear, how
ever, is unfounded and is inconsistent with the state's ability to
convict the husband for other violent crimes including assault and
sodomy, which are equally susceptible to contrivance. 28
A final justification in support of the husband's exemption is
that the rape laws should not apply to the husband because he
does not threaten the community as much as the "ordinary"
rapist. 29 Proponents of this argument believe that the wife is
adequately protected by the assault and battery laws. 30 However, a
woman suffers no less humiliation or fear from forcible rape by her
husband than by another man. 31 Therefore, there is no reason to
insulate the husband from criminal sanctions. 32 The argument that
the husband is less of a threat to the community than the "ordi
nary" rapist also fails because it is based on the outdated view that
rape laws protect the husband's property interest in his wife. 33
Under this view, the "husband-rapist" merely makes use of his own
property34 while the community remains unaffected. However, this
theory has long since ceased to reflect the present day approach to
marriage as a relationship between equals. 35 The rape law should
reflect this change and protect the woman's peace of mind and
physical integrity. It should not exist to protect an anachronistic
property interest. 36
The problem of domestic violence furnishes another policy
reason for abrogating the exemption. By allowing a husband total
immunity for raping his wife, the law encourages acts of domestic
violence. Considering the current magnitude of the domestic vio
lence problem,37 legal policies regarding the marital relationship
27. 6 STAN. L. REV., supra note 18, at 725.
28. Note, supra note 1, at 314.
29. 6 STAN. L. REV., supra note 18, at 725.
30. Id. at 726.
31. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 919, 926 (1973).
32. Id. Assault and battery law protection for the wife is inadequate. See also
Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 135 (1977). In our system of law, the label and punishment for a crime
should be appropriate and correspond to the actual crime committed. English, supra
note 4, at 1225.
33. Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
463, 472 (1975).
34. Note, supra note 1, at 309.
35. Note, supra note 33, at 472.
36. Comment, supra note 31, at 924-25.
37. Violence among all family members is widespread and increasing. Such
violence is commonly inflicted by the husband on the wife. Owens, Battered Wives:
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should discourage, not foster, domestic violence. 38 The husband's
exemption illustrates the failure of the legal system to provide
adequate recourse for the injured spouse. 39 The law is in effect
condoning acts of marital violence.
II.

THE SMITH DECISION

The court in State v. Smith distinguished itself from many
courts by examining some of the policy considerations behind the
husband's rape exemption. 4o The court recognized that Hale's
implied consent rationale arose at a time when women were con
sidered the property of the husband41 and when the role of the
Some Social and Legal Problems, 2 BRIT. J.L. SOC'y 201 (1975). See generally 81
DICK. L. REV. 815, 815 n.2 (1977).
38. There have been various attempts to deal with domestic violence. In Ham
mond City, Indiana, an experimental program places convicted violence-prone
husbands on probation to their battered wives. The wives are sworn in as deputy
probation officers. If the husbands cause any problems, probation is revoked and the
husbands are incarcerated. In addition, husbands can serve their prison sentence on
weekends to avoid losing their jobs. [1975-19761 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 283l. Eng
land has enacted the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (1976).
This Act gives the court injunctive power to restrain violent spouses from additional
acts of violence or to exclude the violent spouse from the home. A power of arrest
can also be attached to the injunction. [1976-197713 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 303l.
These solutions might also be appropriate as alternatives to the husband's rape
exemption in the situation where the parties are still living together and want to
continue the relationship without the violent episodes. In this situation, recourse to
the rape law is not an adequate remedy for the wife. If the husband is convicted, he
will go to prison. This will disrupt the marital relationship at a time when the parties
wish it to continue. However, under the alternatives discussed above, the couple is
allowed to continue their relationship, if so desired, under the stipulation that the
husband refrain from further acts of violence. See also Note, supra note 32. For a
discussion of Massachusetts' approach to the problem of domestic violence, see
McLellan, Massachusetts Divorce Practice and Procedure, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
277,321-24 n.191 (1978).
39. Violence is not usually limited to one episode, but continues during the
marital relationship. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 259 (1971). Victims of domestic violence often have no legal recourse' because
police often fail to intervene in family disputes. [1976-19771 3 FAM. L. REP: (BNA)
2527. Accessibility to the courts is also a problem. [1976-197713 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2528. In Detroit, 4,900 women filed complaints of domestic violence against their hus
bands, but only 300 actually went to court. Will, Brigham, & Ottenberg, Panel Work
shop: violence, crime, sexual abuse and addiction, 5 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 385,
394 (1976). See also note 24 supra.
40. 148 N.J. Super. at 226-27, 372 A.2d at 390. Most courts apply the common
law rule without exploring any rationales behind it. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Landis, 129 Ky. 445, 112 S.W ..581 (1908); Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8
Gray) 489 (1857); State v. Faas, 39 N.J. Super. 306, 121 A.2d 69 (Essex County Ct.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 940 (1957); State V. Williamson, 22 Utah 248, 62 P. 1022
(1900).
4l. 148 N.J. Super. at 229, 372 A.2d at 39l.
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husband was supreme in the marital relationship,42 The court
observed that because rape is a crime which has a unique impact
on the victim,43 a woman's right to sexual privacy should not be
lost because of the legal fiction of consent arising from the mar
riage contract. 44 The court noted that women's social status has
changed over the years and that other areas of the law have re
flected this change. 45 It also recognized that while an unmarried
woman can withdraw consent to sexual intercourse after having
previously consented, a married woman, under the traditional
view, cannot withdraw the consent she has given by marriage, 46
This results in discrimination against the wife rape victim. 47 Based
on these considerations, the court concluded that giving the hus
band a legally protected right to rape his wife ignores the reality of
marital relationships in the twentieth century. 48
Despite its strong reaction to this issue, the court felt com
pelled to follow the common law rule. This decision was based
primarily on certain rules of statutory construction. The court
stated that since the rape statute 49 originated from the common
law, it must be construed strictly to avoid any asserted change. 50
Additionally, since the statute makes no mention of the husband's
exemption, the court relied on the axiom of construction that a
penal statute must be construed strictly to prevent its application
to persons or conduct beyond the contemplation of the legisla
ture. 51 The court also took note of the proposed New Jersey Model

42. [d.
43. "Because of their uniquely personal and oftentimes violent nature, sex
crimes, especially rape, are of great concern to our society. Whether young or old,
the woman may suffer permanent emotional repercussions, and the psychological
conspquences for the victim are impossible to calculate." [d. at 226, 372 A.2d at 390.
44. [d.
45. A close examination of the historical origins of [the husband's rape ex
emption] reveal[sl that it is rooted in the ancient concepts of a wife as a
chattel and the inviolability of the husband's supreme role in a marriage rela
tionship. While such concepts standing alone have long since disappeared,
American courts in their mechanistic application of this principle have failed
to come to grips with the changes that have occurred in the status of a wife
since the 17th century. In other areas modern jurisprudence has consistent
ly refused to permit such male dominated concepts to stand in the way....
[d. at 229, 372 A.2d at 39l.
46. [d.
47. [d.

48. [d.
49. See note 2 supra.
50. 148 N.J. Super. at 230-31, 372 A.2d at 392.
51. [d.
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Penal Code provision52 which would apply the exemption except
when rape is committed between spouses "living apart in a state of
separation. "53
The Smith decision is commendable because the court exam
ined the policies behind the exemption. However, while its choice
of rules of construction was clearly correct, all of the rules relied on
can give way in appropriate circumstances. Regarding the rule of
construing statutes to avoid the asserted change,54 at least one
court has said that old common law doctrines can hardly give reli
able guidance today in the interpretation of a statute promulgated
at a time when individual and social values were vastly different. 55
That court construed a mayhem statute to be more inclusive than it
had been at common law. Under this analysis, the Smith court
could have included the husband within the class of persons
punishable under the rape statute. 56
The Smith court's reliance on the rule of construing statutes
narrowly and ,in favor of the defendant must be analyzed in light of
the reason for the rule. This rule of construction is grounded in the
constitutionally-created vagueness doctrine57 and is based on the
52. [d. at 232, 372 A.2d at 392-93.
53. [d. The Senate Judiciary Committee is debating the New Jersey Penal
Code provision regarding the rape of one's spouse. It appears that the present state
of the law on this issue will prevail. Letter received from John DeCicco, 1st Assis
tant, Appellate Section, State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety
Division of Criminal Justice by author (12/18/77). This letter is on file in the Western
New England Law Review office.
54. For a discussion of this rule of construction, see 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01 (4th ed. 1973).
55. United States v. Cook, 462 F.2d 301, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The defendant
threw lye into Pelzer's eyes. He was charged with and convicted of mayhem under
D.C. CODE § 22-506 (1967). The defendant contended that since he didn't totally
destroy Pelzer's eyesight and no permanent injury was caused, he had not committed
the offense charged. The court refused to interpret the statute solely in light of the
common law which focused on the reduction of the victim's combat ability. The
court stated that the focus of the statute is on the integrity of the person.
56. An additional policy consideration for disregarding the exemption urges
that when the reason for any common law rule ceases, the rule should be discarded.
27 U. FLA. L. REV. 266, 270 (1974). This rule comports with the notion that courts
should not function mechanically, but rather should apply the statute in an intelli
gent, reasoned manner that makes sense as a part of the whole body of law. Ker
nochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 345
(1976). The Smith court applied the exemption in too mechanistic a fashion. Indeed,
the court itself stated that the rule makes no sense in today's society.
57. The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle
is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he
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idea that the legislature owes a duty to its citizens to give fair
warning of prohibited acts 58 by making unmistakably clear those
acts for which a citizen may lose life or liberty. 59 It protects the
individual against the arbitrary discretion of officials and judges. 60
However, the argument that a prosecution of the husband fails to
give the defendant adequate warning as to punishable conduct is
not persuasive here because the statute61 clearly indicates the type
of conduct proscribed, without reference to marital status. A hus
band who rapes his wife knows he is having intercourse with a
woman against her will, and cannot rely on the language of the
statute to claim that his conduct is not forbidden. The statute
clearly states what constitutes the crime of rape and makes plain to
all persons that such conduct will be punished. 62
\
Additionally, this rule of construction is not the only factor to
consider when interpreting a statute63 and is not mandatory in its
application. 64 New Jersey courts have recognized that this rule
does not prevent a court from reading a penal statute in relation to
the evil to be suppressed. 65 The rape statute seeks to prevent or
punish the violation of a woman's sexual privacy by any person. 66
Accordingly, the Smith court could have properly construed the
statute to exclude the husband's exemption.
could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953) (footnote omitted).
58. "The essential purpose of the 'void for vagueness' doctrine is to warn indi
viduals of the criminal consequences of their conduct." Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341
U.S. 223, 230 (1951).
59. "A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the re
quired conduct to one who would avoid its penalties. . . ." Boyce Motor Lines v.
United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). See 3 C. SANDS, supra note 54, § 59.03 (1974).
60. State v. Woodruff, 68 N.J.L. 89, 52 A. 294 (1902); 3 C. SANDS, supra note
54, § 59.03 (1974).
61. See note 2 supra.
62. No more than a reasonable degree of certainty is demanded of a criminal
statute. One whose acts are deliberately close to the area of proscribed conduct risks
crossing the line. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
63. 3 C. SANDS, supra note 54, § 59.06 (1974).
64. Kernochan, supra note 56, at 357.
65. "The rule of strict construction does not prevent a court from reading the
statute in relation to the evil or mischief to be suppressed, ... or prevent a court
from giving effect to the terms of a statute in accordance with their fair and natural
acceptation." State v. Oneida Motor Freight, 27 N.J. Super. 125, 129, 98 A.2d 594,
596 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1953) (quoting State v. Gratale Bros., 26 N.]. Super. 581,
98 A.2d 591 (1953) (Goldman, J.)).
66. Comment, supra note 31; Comment, Washington's Attempt to View Sexual

Assault as More than a "Violation" of the Moral Woman-The Revision of the Rape
Laws, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1975).
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More important, the Smith court was constitutionally man
dated to make such a construction. 67 New Jersey courts have of
course recognized that the judiciary must interpret and apply stat
utes within constitutional limits. 68 Serious constitutional infirmities
result from the inclusion of the husband's exemption in any rape
law because the exemption denies married women who are raped
by their husbands equal protection of the law. 69
67. See generally Hintenberger v. City of Garfield, 49 N.J. Super. 175, 179, 139
A.2d 328, 331 (Super. Ct. Law Div.), afi'd, 52 N.J. Super. 526, 146 A.2d 123 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1958); Gaylord, An Approach to Statutory Construction, 5 Sw. V.L.
REv. 349, 375 (1974).
68. Hintenberger v. City of Garfield, 49 N.J. Super. 175, 179, 139 A.2d 328, 331
(Super. Ct. Law Div.), afI'd, 52 N.J. Super. 526, 146 A.2d 123 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1958).
69. While equal protection challenges to criminal statutes are usually made by
the defendant, the marital rape exemption is a situation where equal protection con
siderations should be viewed from the victim's perspective. Nearly half of the juris
dictions in the United States have recognized victim's rights through state-funded
programs to compensate victims of violent crimes. Harland, Compensating the Vic
tims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 203, 204 (1978). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
52:4B-1O to 4B-11 (West Supp. 1978) which reads as follows:
52:4B-IO. Persons entitled to compensation; order
In any case in which a person is injured or killed by any act or omission
of any other person which is within the description of the offenses listed in
section 11 of this act, the board may, upon application and the concurrence
of a majority of the members thereof, order the payment of compensation in
accordance with the provisions of this act:
a. to or on behalf of the victim,
b. in the case of the personal injury of the victim, where the compensa
tion is for pecuniary loss suffered or expenses incurred by any person re
sponsible for the maintenance of the victim, to that person, or
c. in the case of the death of the victim, to or for the benefit of the
dependents of the deceased victim, or anyone or more of such dependents.

* * * *
52:4B-l1. Causes of personal injury or death
The board may order the payment of compensation in accordance with
the provisions of this act for personal injury or death which resulted from:
(a) an attempt to prevent the commission of crime or to arrest a sus
pected criminal or in aiding or attempting to aid a police officer so to do, or
(b) the commission or attempt to commit any of the following offenses:
1. assault constituting a high misdemeanor;
2. mayhem;
3. threats to do bodily harm;
4. lewd, indecent, or obscene acts;
5. indecent act with children;
6. kidnapping;
7. murder;
8. manslaughter;
9. rape;
10. any other crime involving violence.
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Equal protection infirmities regarding the husband's rape ex
emption have been suggested elsewhere. For example, prior to the
passage of the Michigan Sexual Assault Act,70 the state legislature
discussed the equal protection ramifications of the husband's rape
exemption. The proposed act differentiated between married
couples living apart and those living together. Opponents of this
differentiation claimed that it resulted in a denial of equal protec
tion because only married couples who are living apart are pro
tected under the law.71 A recent note on the marital rape exemp
tion 72 also suggested constitutional problems with the rule by stat
ing that "it deprives an entire class of women the protection of
rape statutes. "73
The Smith court itself hinted at the constitutional deficiency of
the exemption when it stated that "the law discriminates against
the wife rape victim. "74 In discussing why the exemption should be
eliminated, the court added, "In other areas modern jurisprudence
has consistently refused to permit such male dominated concepts to

(Footnote omitted). The purpose of this statute is to provide some measure of com
pensation to innocent victims of crimes in certain cases. In re Carr, 136 N.J. Super.
344,346,346 A.2d 406, 407 (1975).
These statutes attempt to fulfill the state's duty to protect its citizens. Since the
victim has been injured, the state has failed in this duty and should compensate the
victim. McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in America,
11 URB. LAW. 346, 349 (1976). Another rationale views compensation as a right of the
victim. Harland, supra at 206.
Most jurisdictions, however, deny recovery to victims whose injuries were in
flicted by family members because of the ease of fabrication. McAdam, supra at 36l.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West Supp. 1978) which provides that "[n]o
compensation shall be awarded if the victim ... is a relative of the offender...."
Therefore, a wife who is victimized by her husband's violent outburst is denied any
compensation. If raped, she is also denied the enforcement of the rape statute. Equal
protection analysis is an alternative which affords the victim the enforcement of the
criminal statute. Construing a criminal statute from the victim's perspective furthers
the modern trend of recognizing victims' rights.
70. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.S20a-l (1978).
7l. Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 217,
233 (1974). Despite the opposition to the distinction, it was upheld.
The Michigan exemption was also attacked in the case of People v. Hartwell, No.
75-091591-FM (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. Mar. 16, 1976). Here, the defendant
was acquitted of murdering her husband by claiming self defense from a sexual at
tack. The defense contended that the husband's exemption for couples living to
gether was a denial of equal protection. Note, supra note I, at 32l. The court, how
ever, did not rule on the constitutionality of the statute. Id.
72. Id.
73. [d. at 323.
74. 148 N.]. Super. at 228,372 A.2d at 39l.
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stand in the way of equal protection of the laws. The instant case
should be no exception. "75

III.

AN EQUAL PROTECTION ALTERNATIVE

The first step in examining the constitutional infirmities of the
husband's rape exemption is to determine whether the state has
the power under the constitution to punish the husband for a sex
ual act within the marital relationship. One reading of the cases of
Griswold v. Connecticut 76 and Eisenstadt v. Baird 77 would forbid
the state from interfering with the private sexual behavior of mar
ried adults. 78 However, the privacy of marital sex is not immune
from governmental interference where there is a compelling state
interest. 79 At least one court has stated that a state has a compel
ling interest in protecting its citizens from violence, including non
consensual sexual conduct, even if the parties are married to each
other. 80 Since marital rape is clearly nonconsensual sexual conduct,
there was an available analysis enabling the Smith court to hold
that the Constitution permits a state to prosecute a husband for
raping his wife. Additionally, Eisenstadt indicated that the right of
privacy attaches to the individual. 81 Therefore, the fact that a mar
riage exists does not automatically bar any government interven
tion.
Equal protection requires that state legislation which places
persons in different classes for disparate treatment be based on
criteria reasonably related to a legitimate objective of the legisla
tion. 82 In order to determine the standard of review that a court
should apply in determining whether a statute violates equal pro
75.
76.

Id.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
78. Once the state authorizes marriage, it lacks power to intrude on the privacy
right inherent in the marital relationship. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
79. See generally 381 U.S. at 485-86; see also id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., con
curring).
80. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 110,547 P.2d 6, 9 (1976).
81. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity, with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
405 U.S. at 453.
82. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
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tection, the basis of the classification must be examined. The
classification formed by the husband's rape exemption is based on
marital status. 83 Rape victims are treated differently if the rapist
was the victim's husband. The husband enjoys a special immunity
he did not have before the marriage; the wife is denied the protec
tion of a law she enjoyed before her marriage. Thus, the status of
both parties under the rape law changes the moment they are mar
ried. Ordinarily, only a rational basis is needed to support a
classification based on marital status. 84 However, since the rape
exemption infringes on the fundamental right of personal privacy, a
compelling state interest must be shown to sustain the classifica
tion. 85
Cases dealing with the issue of a woman's right to an abortion
illustrate that a woman has a fundamental right of personal privacy
in deciding matters relating to her body. In Roe v. Wade,86 the
Supreme Court discussed the constitutionality of a Texas criminal
abortion lawB 7 which proscribed the procurement of, or attempt to
procure, an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of
saving the mother's life. 88 The Court stated that the fundamental
right of personal privacy exists under the Constitution89 and that
83. The marital rape exemption is not a sex-based classification. Marital status,
not sex, is the critical distinction involved in the husband's exemption. This issue is
beyond the scope of this note.
84. "Under 'traditional' equal protection analysis, a legislative classification
must be sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to
a legitimate governmental interest." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683
(1973).
85. This test is used when a classification is based on race, alienage, or natural
origin. ld. at 682. It is also used when a fundamental right is involved. Such rights
may include activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela
tionships, child rearing, and education. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972).
See notes 86-92 infra and accompanying text.
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. The statute proVided:
Article 1191. Abortion.
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or know
ingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or
shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or inter
nally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the
penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without
her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By 'abortion' is meant that
the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or
that a premature birth thereof be caused.
ld. at 117 n.!.
88. ld. at 117-18.
89. ld. at 152.
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state interference with this right can only be justified by a compel
ling state interest. 90
The same fundamental right of privacy at issue in Roe is at
issue in the rape exemption. In abortion, the issue is whether a
woman has the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. In rape
cases, the husband's exemption focuses on the woman's right to
avoid unwanted intercourse. Both cases tum on the right of a
woman to control her own body.
This right was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis
souri v. Danforth 91 in the context of a constitutional challenge to
provisions of the Missouri abortion statute. One provision required
the written consent of the spouse of a woman seeking an abortion
during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. The Court held the
spousal consent provision unconstitutional, stating "the State can
not 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is
absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first
trimester of pregnancy.' "92 Thus, the Court defined the woman's
right of privacy to be beyond her husband's control.
While these cases were decided on due process grounds, and
are not directly applicable as such to the marital rape exemption, 93
90. [d. at 155. The court then balanced the state's interest in protecting potential
life and safeguarding the public health with the woman's personal right of privacy.
The court concluded that a state criminal abortion law which excepted from criminal
ity only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of
the pregnancy and other interests involved violated the due process clause of the
Constitution. [d. at 164.
9l. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
92. [d. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.
Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975)).
This result is consistent with lower federal court decisions. See, e.g., Doe v.
Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1975), which involved a constitutional chal
lenge to provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which required the
husband's consent prior to the performance of an abortion. The court held this to be
an unconstitutional deprivation of due process because the husband's consent re
quirement failed to give any recognition to the mother's fundamental, though qual
ified, right to have an abortion. The woman's right to an abortion is not absolute,
because at some point during the pregnancy, the state's interest in protecting the po
tentiallife of the fetus outweighs the mother's privacy right. 410 U.S. at 154.
93. The major distinction between the abortion cases and the rape exemption is
state action. While abortion statutes directly prohibit women from obtaining an abor
tion and, therefore, infringe on the woman's right of personal privacy, see note
87 supra, the husband's rape exemption results in an indirect infringement. The
husband-rapist directly violates his wife's right of privacy. The state is prohibiting
the enforcement of a law which protects this right for the class of women who are
raped by someone other than their husband. Whether this action by the state is suffi
cient to attack the rape exemption on due process grounds is beyond the scope of
this note.
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they illustrate the fundamental importance of a woman's right of
personal privacy. Since the husband's rape exemption vitiates this
fundamental right of privacy, the state must show a compelling
interest in order to sustain the exemption.
Cases involving marital classifications in the school environ
ment further illustrate the difficulty in sustaining a marital classifi
cation which affects a fundamental right. In Holt v. Shelton,94 a
school regulation prohibited married students from participating in
activities and functions except for classes in subjects for which
graduation credits were given. The court held the school board's
interest in discouraging high school marriages an insufficient justifi
cation for the infringement on the student's fundamental right to
marry. In Hollon v. Mathis Independent School District,95 the
school board's concern with an increasing dropout rate was also
held to be an insufficient justification to support a regulation which
prohibited any married student from participating in interscholastic
league athletic activities. 96
In other areas of the law, classifications based on marital status 97
94.
95.

341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
358 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Tex. 1973), vacated as moot, 491 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1974). See also Romans v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Davis v.
Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
96. The denial of rights and privileges in the school context is a clear infringe
ment of the students' rights to marry and to be educated. In the rape context, the
denial is less obvious. In parallel fashion, however, the husband's rape exemption
results in a denial of a right the woman would have had if she had remained single.
97. One such example where a classification based on marital status is no
longer applied is the area of credit. Previously, when a single woman with credit
married, her credit status was automatically shifted into the risk category. Her credit
was re-evaluated and based primarily on her husband's credit criteria. Additionally,
all credit information was filed under her husband's name. Thus, the wife could
build no credit standing, and her husband's credit delinquency record was also at
tributed to her. Comment, Women and Credit, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 863, 866 (1974).
Congress rectified this conclusive presumption when it enacted the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. 1978). The Act provides: "(a) It shall be
unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any
aspect of a credit transaction-(I) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract)
...." Id. (emphasis added). .
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), is an example of a case in which a statute
created a classification forming a conclusive presumption regarding marital status. In
Stanley, an Illinois statute provided that children of unmarried fathers, upon death
of the mother, became wards of the state, without any hearing on parental fitness. How
ever, hearings and proof of unfitness were required before the state assumed custody
of children of married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers. Thus, the statute
created the irrebuttable presumption that when the mother is dead the unwed father
is an unfit parent. This presumption did not apply to a married father whose wife
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have been attacked on equal protection grounds. One example in
volves an attack on sodomy statutes. In People v. Johnson,98 a
sodomy statute criminalized certain sexual acts when the parties
were not married to each other.99 The court dismissed the informa
tion against the defendant, stating that, because the marital status
distinction is an unsupportable basis for the classification, the stat
ute denies equal protection of the law to citizens not married to
each other.loo The court acted similarly in People v. Rice lol when
faced with a constitutional attack on the same sodomy statute. The
court could find no rational basis for distinguishing between mar
ried and unmarried people regarding consensual sexual actS. 102 The
court dismissed the charge, concluding that since regulation of a
married person's sexual conduct invades the right of privacy, under
Griswold, regulation of a single person's sexual conduct equally
violates the right to privacy. loa Therefore, a statute prohibiting cer
tain sexual conduct of only unmarried persons denies equal protec
tion. 104
had died. The Supreme Court held this irrebuttable presumption of unfitness an
unconstitutional deprivation of due process and equal protection. Parental fitness
must be established on an individual level.
The husband's rape exemption creates an analogous situation, state action being
the major point of distinction. The rape statute defines rape as "carnal knowledge of
a woman forcibly against her will." See note 2 supra. Since the wife cannot prose
,cute, this creates the presumption that carnal knowledge of a wife is never forcible
and against her will, without giving the wife an opportunity to show otherwise. This
result brings one back to Hale's implied consent rationale, which supporters of the
exemption have regarded as a poor justification for the rule. See notes 17-18 supra
and accompanying text.
For cases involVing irrebuttable presumptions in other contexts, see Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
98. 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266 (City Ct. Buffalo 1974).
99. The New York statute provides: "A person is guilty of consensual sodomy
when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person." N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 130.38 (McKinney 1975).
"[Dleviate sexual intercourse means sexual conduct between persons not married
to each other consisting of contact between the penis and anus, the mouth and penis
or the mouth and vulva...." Id. § 130.00.
100. 77 Misc. 2d at 891, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
101. 80 Misc. 2d 5Il, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1975), rev'd,
41 N.Y.2d 1018, 395 N.Y.S.2d 626, 363 N.E.2d 1371 (1977).
102. Id. at 514, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
103. Although the dismissal of the charge was reversed on appeal, the court did
not rule that the constitutional argument was without merit. The court would not
determine constitutional issues with respect to the sodomy statute from nonfinal or
ders. It said instead that such issues would require a review on the merits when and
if the defendants were convicted. People v. Rice, 41 N.Y.2d 1018, 395 N.Y.S.2d
626,363 N.E.2d 1371 (1977).
104. 80 Misc. 2d at 516, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 489. Courts elsewhere have been re
ceptive to equal protection attacks on sodomy statutes which classified according to
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This analysis applies directly to the husband's rape exemption.
The sole distinction is that in the rape context the acts are not
consensual, as in the sodomy statutes above. This distinction, how
ever, lends support to the application of this analysis to the rape
exemption. Since rape is nonconsensual and far more violent than
consensual sodomy, there is a greater need to give all women the
protection of the law. In view of the fact that the court has the
power to reach both married and unmarried people engaged in
nonconsens'ual acts,105 the state's decision to criminalize one class
and not the other violates the equal protection clause unless there
is a sufficient state interest in maintaining the distinction. Since the
rape exemption infringes the wife's fundamental right,106 the state
must show a compelling interest in making the attempted rape
classification. There are no such compelling interests in the justifi
cations behind the husband's exemption.
marital status, In State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (1975), rev'd, 89 N.M.
305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976), the sodomy statute in question regulated the sexual rela
tions of any adult, regardless of marital status and consent. The statute provided:
Sodomy consists of a person intentionally taking into his or her mouth or
anus the sexual organ of any other person or animal or intentionally placing
his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or animal,
or coitus with an animal. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
complete the crime of sodomy. Both parties may be principals.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-6 (repealed Supp. 1975). The court realized that under
Griswold and Eisenstadt married couples are constitutionally protected from gov
ernmental interference with their consensual sexual relations. 88 N.M. at 193, 539
P.2d at 213. The court then extended the marital privacy right of Griswold to unmar
ried people engaged in consensual sexual acts, stating that to apply the law other
wise would be a violation of equal protection. Id.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the holding that the statute
was unconstitutional. The basis of this reversal was the refusal of the court to extend
the Griswold decision beyond married couples. State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 305, 551
P.2d 1352 (1976).
A New Jersey court has held that its sodomy statute does not violate equal pro
tection. The statute does not prohibit certain conduct of married couples. At the
same time, the statute does not recognize the right of consenting unmarried couples
to practice the same consensual conduct. State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748
(1973). The reason for this holding was the court's reluctance to extend the Griswold
right of privacy to unmarried consenting adults. Id. at 396-97, 301 A.2d at 753.
These courts found that no denial of equal protection results when the right of
privacy, as interpreted in Griswold, is limited to married couples. Therefore, the
state is not applying the statute arbitrarily to different classes of people. Rather, the
state has the power to regulate only one of the classes. In either case, this reversal
does not affect the application of these principles to the marital rape exemption. In
the rape context, there is no issue of marital privacy under Griswold. Therefore, the
Griswold decision is a stumbling block only to an equal protection analysis of con
sensual conduct, and not to an analysis of the marital rape exemption.
105. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 86-92 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The husband's rape exemption violates the equal protection
clause because there is no justification sufficient to uphold the in
fringement on the woman's right of personal privacy. The implied
consent justification has even been discounted by supporters of the
exemption. 107 Problems of prooP08 and fear of coercive claims 109
both center on the inconvenience to the state in permitting the
prosecution. However, administrative convenience should not jus
tify an infringement of a fundamental right. 110 Reconciliation and
promotion of marital harmony111 are certainly legitimate govern
mental interests, but the exemption does not operate to further these
interests. 112 On the contrary, the enforcement of the rape law
against the husband would promote marital tranquility. Spouses
would be encouraged to work out their marital problems within the
framework of the law, and would not be allowed to engage in con
duct which is clearly illegal. 113
The Smith court had alternative methods of statutory construc
tion to exclude the husband's rape exemption from the New Jersey
statute. On its face, the statute did not exempt the husband. The
court could have given the statute its plain meaning by ignoring
the common law exemption. However, the court, while feeling
compelled to recognize the common law, could have eliminated the
exemption by considering the equal protection ramifications of in
cluding this additional term. By subjecting the rape exemption to
an equal protection analysis, the court could have brought the rape
law into line with other areas of the law which have ceased to
classify solely on the basis of marital status. Moreover, by adopting
this approach, the court could have set the constitutional parame
ters for the legislature in its reformation of the rape law. 114 Most
107. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
1l0. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
llI. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
112. See note 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
113. See Scutt, Consent in Rape: The Problem of the Marriage Contract, 3
MONASH L. REV. 255, 272 (1977). "[Plublic policy ... surely ought not to support
what in effect are criminal acts committed against the person, which can hardly be
calculated to inspire, maintain, or preserve a happily married relationship." [d.
114. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text. The court can encroach on
the legislative sphere where there is a constitutional violation. Maule v. Conduit and
Foundation Corp., 124 N.J. Super. 488,494, 307 A.2d 651, 655 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1973).
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important, the court could have ended the unconstitutional infringe
ment on a married woman's right of personal privacy by granting to
her the equal protection of the rape law.

Stuart M. Litoff

